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WHY CHARITABLE TRUSTS FAIL
WILLIAm L. CRow
A FTER deploring in vigorous language the occasional strangling
of the high purposes of individuals who wish to devote a part
or all of their property to the public good, which strangling leads to
the diversion of these accumulations to private enjoyment, contrary
to the "will of him whose last days are solaced with the thought that
his public benefactions would build an enduring monument to his
memory in the hearts of a grateful people," Marshall, J., in Harring-
ton v. Pier' pledged anew judicial adherence to the long established
rule "that gifts to charitable uses should be highly favored and con-
strued by the most liberal rules that the nature of each case, as pre-
sented, would admit of, rather than the gift should fail, and the intent
of the donor fail of accomplishment." He was applying the ancient
maxim, Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
Charitable trusts are, indeed, highly favored by the courts. But in
spite of this fundamental attitude of favoritism, an examination of
decided cases in various jurisdictions indicates that judicial rules come
in more than one brand, and that the liberality of good-intentioned
philanthropists may be thwarted even in a court of professed generous
tendencies, owing to the nature of each case. The present discussion
is concerned for the most part with trusts that have failed; but quite
a substantial amount of it would become obsolete were the problem
approached with the simplicity, and enlightenment too, which accom-
panied a recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 2 But, the
author feels, no attempt is made here to fight for the end of servility
to irrational historical precedents.
Why do charitable trusts fail, as they too frequently do? The courts
which have been instrumental in producing the most casualties have
found four primary reasons: (1) uncertainty as to the expression of
purpose; (2) uncertainty as to subject matter; (3) uncertainty as to
beneficiaries; and (4) failure, under certain conditions, to express a
general charitable intention.
1105 Wis. 485, 82 N.W. 345 (1900).
2In re Jordan's Estate (Pa. 1938) 197 Atl. 150. A testatrix gave a certain part
of her estate to "charity," naming no trustee and specifying no charities. By
applying without equivocation the doctrine that charities are the favorite of
the law, the trust was upheld. This, however, is not the first decision of its
kind in the United States. Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 17 N.E. 839 (1888).
A testator left property to a trustee "to be disposed of by him for such
charitable purposes as he shall think proper." The trustee died before acting.
The court by Holmes, J., held that the gift was unconditional and should be
applied to charitable purposes under the direction of the court.
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(1) UNCERTAINTY AS TO PURPOSE
The decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, to which ref-
erence has just been made, while commending itself as a reasonable
application of a high resolve to save charitable trusts, does not repre-
sent the general rule in the United States. The expressed purpose is
too general. Even the justice in the Wisconsin decision who argued so
brilliantly in the cause of saving charitable trusts found himself help-
less unless there was a particularization of the charitable purpose.3
How far must this particularization go? In a recent South Carolina
decision4 the court had to deal with a situation where property was
given by will in trust to executors to be paid "to such corporations or
associations of individuals as will in their judgment best promote the
cause of preventing cruelty to animals in the vicinity of Asheville."
The court found that uncertainty extended not only to the beneficiaries
and to the discretionary power given to the executors, but to the ulti-
mate purpose of the gift. "By what means," inquired the court, "is the
promotion of the cause to be effectuated ?" Presumably if the testator
had said, for example, that the prevention of cruelty was to be pro-
moted by educational methods, the court, on this point, would have
been satisfied.
(2) UNCERTAINTY AS TO SUBJECT MATTER
While the decided cases are not very numerous, it is the general
rule that there cannot be a valid charitable trust without certainty of
subject matter.5 Minot v. Parker6 held void a charitable trust on these
facts. A testator bequeathed the residue of his estate to his executors
for charitable purposes, authorizing them at the same time to give to
3 Harrington v. Pier, mpra note 1. "Given a trust, with or without a trustee, a
particular purpose-as education, or relief of the poor, as distinguished from a
bequest to charity generally-and a class great or small, and without regard to
location, necessarily . . .and we have a good trust for charitable purposes."
(Italics supplied.) The reason had previously been given in Webster v. Morris,
66 Wis. 366, 28 N.W. 353 (1886). "The courts in this state have no ...
prerogative jurisdiction, but 'only a strictly judicial power . . .' Before that
power can be exercised, however, the scheme of charity must be sufficiently
indicated, and its object made sufficiently certain, to enable the court to enforce
the execution of the trust according to such scheme, and for such object. It
must be of such a tangible nature that the court can deal with it The mere
direction to expend money for charitable purposes at large is too indefinite
and uncertain to be carried into execution ..!"
Following a similar principle, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Bramblett
v. Trust Co. (Ga. 1936) 185 S.E. 72, found the purpose too uncertain in a
gift by will of property to trustees to erect, maintain and equip a "home for
gentlewomen," there being no description of the nature of the proposed home.
"Is it," asked the court, "for the aged, impotent, diseased, or poor? Or for
educational or religious purposes?"
4 Woodcock v. Trust Co., 214 N.C. 224, 199 S.E. 20 (1938).
5 Contra, Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 48 S.C. 444, 26 S.E. 717 (1897).
6 189 Mass. 176, 75 N.E. 149 (1905).
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any of the testator's relatives, whom without reason he might have
overlooked, such sum as might seem to the testator or his executors
under all the circumstances fitting, suitable, and proper. "While the
general intention of the testator that the residue of the estate should
be held by the executors in trust is fully apparent," said the court,
"the unfortunate terms he employed to express this permits the fund
... to be wholly applied for objects which are not charitable in law, or
for purposes so uncertain as not to be capable of identification, or for
the benefit of relatives not named, and who, by reason of the descrip-
tive limitation, imposed by him, cannot otherwise be ascertained. The
whole trust, therefore, becomes too indefinite for the court to admin-
ister, and a resulting trust must be decreed in favor of the next of
kin . . ." In Wilce v. Van Andren7 a testator provided in his will that
after the death of his widow and daughter to whom were given life
annuities, the trustees could give such part of the remaining estate as
they thought best and proper to any one or more of the testator's
brothers or sisters who in the judgment of the trustees might stand
in need of it, with whatever thereafter remained to be devoted by the
trustees, in their discretion, to certain charities. "There are two consid-
erations," the court pointed out, "which render the gift to charity void
for uncertainty. In the first place, it is uncertain what, in any, amount
will remain upon the death of the annuitants; and, secondly, the trustees
have a discretion as to whether they will give what remains, if any,
after the death of the annuitants to a needy brother or sister or donate
it to charity."
(3) UNCERTAINTY AS TO BENEFICIARIES
There is no uniformity in the several jurisdictions as to the effect
of uncertainty of beneficiaries in the will or instrument creating a
charitable trust. The courts of some states hold that it is sufficient if
the general class of beneficiaries is designated, leaving to the trustees
the duty of selecting from such class the particular individuals or cor-
porations to be benefited; but there are other courts which hold quite
to the contrary. The trust fails when a general class has been indicated,
although the power of selection from that class has been specifically
given to a trustee.
As a matter of fact, charitable trusts have been held void for
uncertainty as to beneficiaries when (1) the class is large and widely
distributed and no power of selection by the trustee has been given;
(2) when the class is large and uncertain, although the trustee has
been given the power of selection; and (3) when no class is indicated,
the decision as to the application of the funds resting entirely in the
7248 Ill. 358, 94 N.E. 42 (1911).
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discretion of the trustee. In Moran v. Moran8 a will provided for prop-
erty to be divided by trustees among the Sisters of Charity. The court
took judicial notice of the fact that Sisters of Charity exist through-
out Iowa and the United States. Holding the trust void for uncertainty
as to beneficiaries, the court used this language: "If the bequest should
be sustained, how would the trustees execute it? No one would say
that it should be divided among all of them, for such, in reason, could
not have been the intention. There is no limitation as to locality, state
or nation .... We infer that appellees think the trustees may select to
whom the bequest shall be given. The will does not so provide." The
court in People v. Powers9 had to deal with a devise to a trustee, with
power to dispose of property "among charitable and benevolent institu-
tions or corporations in the city of Rochester, as he shall choose, and
in such sums and proportions as he shall deem proper." The gift was
held void for uncertainty. The court, upon reflection, discovered a
rather large number of existing charities in the city of Rochester,
and then concluded that the inclusion of all charitable institutions
within the city was probably never contemplated or intended by the
testatrix. The court's holding was based upon the failure of the testa-
trix to indicate a class of beneficiaries to whom distribution would be
practicable or that could be identified with reasonable certainty.
In Tilden v. Green0 there was a devise to trustees to apply the prop-
erty to "such charitable, educational, and scientific purposes as in the
judgment of my executors will render ... my property most widely and
substantially beneficial to mankind." In holding this trust void for
indefiniteness as to beneficiaries, the court said: "As the selection of
the objects of the trust was delegated absolutely to the trustees, there
is no person or corporation who could demand any part of the estate,
or maintain an action to compel the trustees to execute the power in
their favor. This is the fatal defect in the will." The trustees in Johnson
v. Johnson'1 were given discretion in the selection of beneficiaries,
although the testator indicated a preference if the way be clear for a
grand female college. Said the court: "Under the broad discretion and
power, the trustees might, instead of a female school, establish a public
library or a lecture room, or a church or woman's home, or any other
charity; and if either of these should be selected by these trustees as
the object of this devise, certainly it could not be said they had ex-
ceeded their powers and discretion, and, if either should be established,
it would not be because of direction in the will of the testator, but
from choice and preference on the part of the trustees." In Jones v.
8 104 Iowa 216, 73 N.W. 617 (1897).
9 147 N.Y. 104, 41 N.E. 432 (1895).10 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880 (1891).1192 Tenn. 559, 23 S.W. 114 (1893).
1940]
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Patterson12 a will placed property in the hands of an individual "to be
used for missionary purposes in whatever field he thinks best to use
it, so it is done in the name of my dear Savior and for the salvation
of souls." The court, holding the provision void, used this language:
"The entire matter is . . . left to the wisdom, or it may be, the whim
or caprice of the trustee. Strong and far-reaching as is the arm of
equity in upholding such a charity, the one here sought to be created is
beyond its grasp."
In the recent case of Hedin v. Westdala Lutheran Church13 the
Supreme Court of Idaho was called upon the first time to make a
decision concerning a provision in a will in which the beneficiaries
were not made certain, the trustee being given "full power and absolute
authority to distribute such moneys as may come into his hands as
such trustee for any and all such charitable or religious purposes as
my said trustee may elect from time to time . . ." With one justice dis-
senting, the trust was held void. The court pointed out that the English
doctrine was not in existence in Idaho, that there was no king in their
state and no court with ministerial power.
The better rule is that the trust should not fail when only a general
class of beneficiaries has been indicated, and although no method of
selection from the class has been designated by the settlor. The reason
for the opposite holding is historical. While we inherited the common
law of England so far as it was adapted to our new environment and
to our form of government, the question arose a short time after the
Revolution as to whether the English system of charities had its origin
in Statute 43, Elizabeth, and whether such system was adopted in or
adapted to this country. Those courts which held that the common law
system was dependent upon the Statute of Elizabeth and that the
Statute was not adapted to this country concluded that charitable
bequests, therefore, must have all the elements of certainty of a private
trust, which would include, of course, certainty as to beneficiaries. 1 4
12271 Mo. 1, 195 S.W. 1004 (1917).
13 (Idaho 1938) 81 P. (2d) 741.
14 "There is, perhaps, no subject concerning which there is greater diversity of
decisions in the different states than the certainty and definiteness required in
the beneficiaries and objects of charity. The radical differences in the views
of the courts have been produced, to some extent, by statutory provisions,
and largely by the question whether the Statute of 43 Elizabeth has been
recognized or adopted as the law of the state. In some states the statute is
not recognized as a part of the law, and in others all trusts, except those
specifically enumerated in statutes, have been abolished, and in those states
objects and beneficiaries must be described with great certainty. In states
where the Statute of Elizabeth is in force as a part of the law, the disposi-
tion has been to follow English rules to a great extent and to permit a great
degree of uncertainty as to beneficiaries. The effort of such courts is to sus-
tain a gift to charity if it can be done, and they will not declare a trust void
if there is a power of appointment somewhere, by which the object may be
rendered certain." Welch v. Caldwell, 226 Ill. 488, 80 N.E. 1014 (1907).
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(4) FAILURE TO EXPRESS A GENERAL CHARITABLE INTENTION
If the performance of a trust is impracticable, impossible or illegal,
the particular gift fails. Thereupon the cy pres 5 doctrine is applied by
the courts", in accordance with the principle that charitable gifts are
especially favored in the law. However, this doctrine has no applica-
tion when the donor has not expressed, or the court cannot find, a
general charitable intent. If the cy pres doctrine cannot be applied, the
trust fails and the property passes to the heirs at law.
What is an impractical or impossible gift turns out to be, of course,
a matter of fact, to be proved like any other fact before a court in
equity cases. However, certain important decisions dealing with im-
practicality or impossibility are illuminating even in the field of fact
finding. In the case of Teele v. Bishop,'7 decided by the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts, the testatrix had made a bequest to trus-
tees to purchase a lot and build a chapel in Carndrine, Ireland, "to be
used for public worship." It was found to be impracticable to carry
out the provisions of the will because the population of Carndrine was
small and diminishing. The people were too poor to support a chapel;
and the bishop refused to assist in its maintenance. The same court
decided a few years later the case of Bowden v. Brown.' In this in-
stance the testatrix gave her residuary estate to the town of Marble-
head toward the erection of a building that should be for the sick and
poor, those without homes. The court came to the conclusion that the
particular purpose became impracticable or impossible, giving two rea-
sons therefor: (1) The city of Marblehead refused to erect such a
building, and (2) the property available for the purpose, amounting
to about $8,000.00, was insufficient. "It is manifest," said the court,
"that the property... is insufficient for the existence and maintenance
of such a building as the testatrix contemplated."
In Gilman v. Burnett,9 decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine, the testatrix had provided that her farm (appraised at
$2,360.00) be held in trust as a home for one or more unmarried
women who have been employed in the straw industry of Massachu-
setts, where they might have a place of refuge and comfort. It was held
that the trust was so impracticable that it could not be satisfactorily
executed, the court giving the following reasons: (1) The real estate
was grossly insufficient for the contemplated purpose; and (2) while
the testatrix had in her will suggested that somebody else might be
15 From the Norman French, "Cy pres comme possible," mneaning "as near as
possible."
16 Some courts do not recognize this doctrine and therefore do not apply it.
17 168 Mass. 341, 47 N.E. 422 (1897).
1s200 Mass. 269, 86 N.E. 351 (1908).
19 116 Maine 382, 102 At. 108 (1917).
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interested enough to augment her bequest, there had in fact been no
additional endowment. Even if the property could be sold, the accumu-
lations would be so meagre as to postpone the enjoyment of the gift
so far in the future that the purpose of the testatrix would be thwarted.
On the subject of impracticability or impossibility, with the result-
ing failure of the particular gift, Restatement of the Law of Trusts
analyzes three possible contingencies which are pertinent to the present
discussion, viz., a specific provision in the trust that in case of the fail-
ure of its purpose the trust should terminate; an amount insufficient for
the intended purpose; and a purpose which has already been accom-
plished:
"b. Specific provisions in the terms of the trust. If property
is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose,
and it is provided by the terms of the trust that if the purpose
should fail the trust should terminate, the property will not be
applied cy pres on the failure of the particular purpose, since the
terms of the trust negative the existence of a general charitable
intention. In such a case there will be a resulting trust for the
settlor or his estate, unless there is a valid gift over ...
g. Amount insufficient for the intended purpose. If prop-
erty is given in trust for a particular charitable purpose and the
amount given is so small that it is impossible to accomplish the
purpose with the amount so given, the intended trust fails if,
but only if, the settlor manifested an intention to restrict his gift
to the particular purpose which he specified ...
If the amount required for the particular purpose does not
greatly exceed the amount given, the court may direct an
accumulation of the income until the amount becomes sufficient.
Ordinarily, however, the court will not direct such an accumula-
tion in the absence of a direction in the terms of the trust.
h. Particular purpose already accomplished . . . When a
testator bequeaths property in trust to establish a hospital in a
town, and a similar hospital has been established in the town
and no useful purpose would be accomplished by having two
hospitals, the court will direct the application of the property
cy pres if the testator had a more general intention, as for exam-
ple, by making other provisions for the sick in the town, or by
establishing a hospital elsewhere. If, however, the testator mani-
fested an intention to restrict his gift to the particular purpose
of establishing a hospital in the town, and the purposes which
would thereby be accomplished are fully accomplished by the
establishment of the other hospital, the trust fails and a result-
ing trust will arise for the testator's estate."
In case the trust is found to be impracticable or impossible of per-
formance, how and when does the cy pres doctrine apply?
20 § 399, p. 1208.
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The cy pres doctrine, as has already been pointed out, is one of
approximation. It is a doctrine of liberal construction in the applica-
tion of charitable trusts. An excellent definition of the doctrine is found
in Restatement of the Law of Trusts :21
"If the property is given in trust to be applied to a particular
charitable purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or imprac-
ticable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and if the
settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the prop-
erty to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court
will direct the application of the property to some charitable pur-
pose which falls within the general charitable intention of the
settlor. 22
It will be noted from this definition that the thing which saves a
trust from failure in case of impracticality, impossibility, or illegality
is the manifestation on the part of the settlor of a more general inten-
tion to devote the property to charitable purposes. The expression of
this general intent is the guiding principle. Professor Carl Zollmann
2 3
put the matter succinctly in the following language: "There is nothing
mythical connected with the American doctrine ... They [the courts]
are merely construing the instrument before them in a liberal manner,
with a view of promoting and accomplishing the donor's charitable in-
tent." He then proceeds to state that this is only following the rule
which says that the testator's intention shall prevail and nothing else.
After quoting an Indiana court 24 to the effect that the cy pres doctrine
of liberal construction will cause courts to be keen to discover whether
the main purpose is charity, and, if it is, to treat the testator's ma-
chinery of administration, not as a condition precedent to vesting, but
as suggestions regarding management, he continues: "The testator's
intention is the one controlling factor. It is the trail which courts must
follow in all its turns and windings, through swamps and over hills,
provided only that it has been sufficiently blazed and does not trespass
on forbidden territory."2 5
The necessity of a general purpose on the part of the donor is
clearly stated in Brown v. Condit26 : "A court of equity will carry out
the expressed general charitable purpose of the donor by the use of
means other than those specified, when such means have become im-
21 § 399, p. 1208.
22 Some states have adopted this doctrine by legislation after the courts have
refused to recognize it judicially, such refusal being on the ground that it is a
sovereign or prerogative power. Wisconsin, for example, has a statutory
enactment worded considerably like he definition in RESTATEMENT, WIS. STATS.
(1939) § 231.11 (7)d. For a similar Minnesota statute, see In re Peterson's
Estate (Minn. 1938) 277 N.W. 529.2 3 ZOLLMANN, CHAaRTIs, c. III, § 124.
2 Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 134 N.E. 276, 280 (1922).
- ZOL.MANN, CH~ArrEs, § 140.
26 70 N.J. Eq. 440, 61 Atl. 1055, 1057 (1905).
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practicable or impossible of use. But in such cases there is a general
or comprehensive charitable purpose set forth in the will or inferable
from its provisions; beyond which the court will not go in its substitu-
tions."
Discussing the question as to whether a testator has expressed a
general or only a particular intent, George Gleanson Bogert in The Law
of Trusts and Trustees27 says:
"Thus, if a man desires to leave a fund for the support of
a particular school, he may do so, the courts say, with either
one of two general attitudes of mind. He may have in his
thought the extension of education and the dissemination of
knowledge as his primary objects, and then may cast about for
a means of accomplishing this general educational charitable
intent and select a school as an instrument. Here the choice of
a school is secondary and incidental. It is not a vital choice with
the settlor. But, on the other hand, the settlor may be funda-
mentally interested in a certain school, and leave money in trust
to advance and support that school. Here it is possible that his
desire may be merely to help this particular educational institu-
tion, and that he has no interest in education in general or in
any other scheme for extending educational advantages. In
other words, his mind may be set on founding or continuing a
particular bit of educational machinery, and he may have the
attitude that, if this institution cannot be employed, he does not
desire to help any other school or otherwise to forward educa-
tion.
If the intent has been narrow and exclusive, the courts have
felt that they would not be justified in altering the trust or
changing the application of the fund. They have believed them-
selves compelled to return the property to the settlor or his suc-
cessors under a resulting trust, when the express trust for char-
ity has failed for any reason."
When is an intent general? Professor Bogert mentions three situa-
tions in which the courts find a general purpose or intent: (1) when
the settlor has specifically provided that his intent is general; (2) when
he has given two or more alternative methods of accomplishing his
charitable intent; and (3) when the bulk of the testator's fortune is
given to charities of various sorts.28
It happens occasionally that a testator, in making a specific gift to
charity, will in more or less appropriate words, express a general
intent. In the case of Re Orr29 a testatrix, giving her entire estate in
trust, stated one purpose as follows: "Ten thousand dollars as a fund
to be used in lending to deserving people . . . to buy small homes or
farms-this money can be lent at 6 per cent or whatever is lawful on
2 7 p. 1210.
2S Ibid., p. 1314.
2940 Ont. L. Rep. 567 (1917).
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good security. The profits accruing can be utilized... in such work as
is helpful to men and women who are willing to know and experience
the truth as revealed in the Bible and which has been unlocked... by
Mary Baker Eddy." The bequest was held void for uncertainty, but
the cy pres doctrine was applied because of one sentence in the will
which the court found was expressive of a general charitable purpose:
"The whole of my estate must be used for God only." In Grinzke v.
Malone30 a general purpose was indicated by this phrasing in a will:
"I have long entertained a desire of assisting colored people of my
country who have been oppressed and downtrodden in the past, and
are now unjustly treated, kept back and hindered in the race of life
because of a cruel prejudice against them." The residue of the estate
was given to a certain home for these people. The particular gift having
failed, the court then considered the question as to whether the cy pres
doctrine had any application. "This depends," said the court, "upon
whether the language of the will indicates a general charitable intent,
to be carried out for the benefit of young persons of the colored race,
. ..or whether the object of the testatrix was limited to a specific
charity . ..We think the will contains very plain indications of a
general charitable intent in reference to colored people."
While there are numerous decided cases dealing with provisions in
wills bequeathing property in trust for charitable purposes where no
general purpose or intent of the testator has been expressed, two or
three here will suffice for purposes of illustration. In Re University of
London Medical Sciences Inst. Fund31 a testator bequeathed a very
gubstantial sum to the Institute of Medical Sciences Fund, University
of London. The scheme was abandoned; and the court held the cy pres
doctrine inapplicable in disregard of the suggestion of the attorney
general to the contrary. "There is not one word in the will," remarked
Joyce, J., "upon which to found the theory of the testator having any
general or other purpose of charity save the particular scheme of the
projected institute." A somewhat similar case was decided in Maine.3 2
The court quoted from Perry on Trusts,3 3 where the author pointed
out that if it appears from the whole instrument the gift was for a
particular purpose, and there was no general charitable intention, there
can be no application of the cy pres doctrine. By way of illustration he
mentions the case of a testator who had in mind the building of a
church. If the specific objective is incapable of execution the gift goes
to the next of kin.
30206 Mass. 49, 91 N.E. 899 (1910).
312 Ch. (Eng.) 1. (1909).
32 Brooks v. Belfast, 90 Me. 318, 38 Atl. 222 (1897).
332 PERRY, TRUSTS § 726.
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In the case of Quimby v. Quimby34 the court lays down a rule for
the determination of a general intention. The testator had made a gift
in trust to the Chicago Waifs' Mission and Training School. This par-
ticular institution being no longer in existence, the court was called
upon to make inquiry as to the application of the cy pres doctrine.
In denying the application of the doctrine under the circumstances,
and in drafting a test to be applied, the court used the following lan-
guage:
"From an inspection of the clause of the will under consid-
eration it is seen that the testatrix used no special words indi-
cating an intention to benefit needy boys and girls generally; so
that the critical question arises, can a general charitable intent to
benefit a particular class of dependents be deduced from the sole
fact that the intent of the testator becomes impossible ... The
test seems to be this, that if the bequest is to a cause or for a
purpose or to aid and further a plan or scheme of public benefit,
there is evidence of a general charitable intent... Applying this
test to the clause of the will before us, it will been seen at once
that the gift is not for any cause, plan or scheme of charity, but
to a specific and particular organization. We therefore must hold
that the better reasoning favors the conclusion that no general
charitable intent was indicated by the testatrix in her will ... "
"We have reached the foregoing conclusion not forgetting
that gifts to charity are especially favored in law, and that courts
should be 'keen-sighted' to discover an intention to make a gift
to charity."
Can a general intent be inferred from a particular intent? In the
case of Teele v. Brown, supra, where the trust was to purchase a lot
and build a chapel, the court was of the opinion that the cy pres doc-
trine was not applicable. The leading purpose of the testatrix was the
purchase of a lot and the building of a chapel. To direct the bequest
to other purposes and other suggested schemes would be at variance
with those designated by the testatrix, and not in furtherance of any
general intent on her part. A general intent to advance religion, in the
mind of the court, could not be inferred from the particular purpose
of building a chapel. It will be recalled that the erection of a building
for the sick and poor was the purpose of Bowden v. Brown. When that
trust became impracticable or impossible, the cy pres doctrine could
not be invoked, said the court, "the reason being that there was no
intent to make general provision for the sick and poor of the town un-
less they could be provided with a home in a building to be erected
for their use . . . General provision for the sick and poor would seem
to include a charity much broader than anything in her contemplation."
In Gilman v. Burnett, supra, where a trust providing a home for certain
3 175 Ill. App. 367 (1912).
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unmarried women was held impracticable, the court used this emphatic
language in a denial of the application of the cy pres doctrine: "We
search in vain in the will ... for evidence of any general charitable
intent on the part of the testatrix... Here the emphasis is laid not
on the general relief of the beneficiaries named, but on one specific
object to be carried out at one specific place ... There is nothing to
indicate that the testatrix intended to make any provision for the
recipients of her bounty unless they could be provided for in the
old home . . . Her charitable purpose was linked with the particular
farm which constituted the subject of her bounty."
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion makes clear that there is no uniformity of
decision in the various states of the United States as to the amount of
certainty necessary in the framing of a charitable trust. This country
has both its Pennsylvanias and its Idahos.
In all states those who purpose public benefactions must, of course,
in order to be sure that their wishes will be carried out, either know
the law or seek skilled advice; but the price of ignorance is much
higher in some jurisdictions than in others. While this author, like
Justice Marshall of Wisconsin, is inclined to engage in lamentation
when a charitable trust fails, he has no utopian rules of a comprehen-
sive nature to recommend at this particular time.35 He is well aware,
as was said by an early chief justice of Pennsylvania, that the courts
can no more make wills for the dead than contracts for the living; but
he has also in mind a statement by Lord Hardwicke that there is no
authority to construe a bequest void if it can possibly be made good in
law. Therefore, in the present state of the law he would rather under-
take the more profitable task of re-emphasizing for lawyers-lawyers
whose general practice now and then requires the drawing of instru-
ments with provisions for charity-the fact that there are precautions
that must be taken and rules that must be obeyed. The main purpose
here might be summed up as two-fold: In some cases, the clearing of
a highway, at least in part, over which the donor may travel to a
destination he has in mind; and, in other cases, to call to the attention
of the donor that he must re-define and clarify his objectives.
In the drafting of a will or other instrument which provides for
a charitable trust, it is, therefore, necessary to anticipate numerous
35 The legislature of Wisconsin has plugged some gaps within the last half
dozen years by not only enacting the cy pres doctrine, but by providing that
indefiniteness shall not result in a failure of the trust when the trustee is
given power by the instrument to designate the purpose, or because the donor
has neglected to indicate the method by which the purpose is to be accom-
plished. Wis. STATs. (1939) § 231.11.
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situations. In a kind of recapitulation, the questions which follow are
important, but, of course, not exhaustive. Is the purpose of the donor
particularized? Does he have a general charitable intent, or is the char-
ity limited to a particular object? If the objective is limited, is this fact
clearly declared? If the intent is general, is this intent expressed in the
instrument? Is there a clear separation of charitable gifts from private
gifts? Is the gift considered carefully for any indication of imprac-
ticability or impossibility? Would the main purpose of the gift be
thwarted by a substantial diminution of the funds? Are the beneficiaries
capable of being identified according to the state ruling where the
donor resides? If the erection of a building is contemplated, is the
building to be erected or purchased immediately, or are the funds to
accumulate interest for a specified maximum time? Does the donor
contemplate the augmentation of his gift from other sources? If there
is no augmentation, what are his wishes? Is the gift to be restricted
to a certain locality? Does the donor realize the possibility that his
gift might be declared void by the courts, resulting (in the absence
of other provision) in the enjoyment of the property by the next of
kin? Has the donor provided a reverter in case of a diversion of the
trust property by the trustee?
It is hoped that with some questions like these in mind the donor
or his attorney might bring closer to realization the maxim quoted in
the beginning, Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
